Regional land-use planning and regionally-based economic development have evolved to a large extent as parallel but separate entities, each occupying distinct policy domains. This absence of holism in regional policy-making has been mirrored by the limited level of academic interest in examining the linkages between regional economic development policies, on one hand, and physical land-use planning, on the other. This paper considers the extent to which proposals from the Blair-led Labour government for Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) in England represent a continuation of the historic disjunction between economic development and strategic planning. It begins by assessing earlier attempts to integrate strategic planning and economic development concerns and, in light of the experience of earlier initiatives, assesses the prospects for the latest set of 'regional' proposals. Firstly, it explores the means by which conflict between the development-led priorities of RDAs and those expressed through RPG might be resolved.
Introduction
Regional planning in Britain can be characterised by continual efforts to define and redefine its concept and scope. This has often involved parallel and separate efforts to create mechanisms for regional land-use planning and regionally-based economic development. Only rarely have these strands converged, and isolated attempts to apply strategic regional land-use planning perspectives to the efforts of regionally-based economic development agencies have been prone to conflict. The disconnection of regional planning and development in this way has continued in the wake of the election of a Labour government in 1997, with the publication of the White Paper on Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (DETR, 1997) and consultation papers on the Future of Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) (DETR, 1998a) and Planning Policy Guidance Note 11 (DETR, 1999a) . This paper considers the degree to which this most recent set of proposals for regionally-based structures are likely to bridge the historic fissure between economic development and strategic planning. The paper begins with a summary of the historical development of regional planning and economic development in England and assesses earlier attempts to integrate land-use planning and economic development concerns at the regional level. Second, it explores the emerging wave of regionally-based planning and economic development institutions and initiatives and addresses two specific questions: by what means might conflict between the development-led priorities of RDAs and those expressed through Regional Planning Guidance best be reconciled; and to what extent does the flexibility given to individual regions to determine their approaches mark a genuinely 'regionspecific' planning, as opposed to a continuation of 'centralist regional' planning?
Regional planning and economic development revisited
The origins of British regional policy can be traced back to the early twentieth century when regional offices and committees were established to co-ordinate war-time production and distribution during the First World War (see Smith, 1964) . There has also been a long-standing tradition of ad hoc attempts at physical land use planning at the regional or sub-regional level, influenced by the pioneering ideas of Patrick Geddes, later popularised by Lewis Mumford and the American Regional Planning Association (see, for example, Geddes 1915; Mumford, 1938) . In the inter-war years, a number of voluntary associations of local authorities (Joint Town Planning Advisory Councils) were established to oversee the production of regional or sub-regional plans, the earliest of which was the Doncaster Regional Planning Scheme (1922) . These plans, often prepared by planning consultants, were exercises in physical land use planning, with an emphasis on land allocations and zoning. Their impact, however, was often limited by disagreements and conflicts between participating councils, especially rural counties and urban boroughs (Glasson, 1978) .
By the Second World War, Regional Commissioners were appointed to control the affairs of the ten Civil Defence Regions. Regional offices of the government were to have been instituted in the event of a breakdown in effective government from London. Regionally-based administration was seen as a plausible means by which government could continue, but was also viewed as a pragmatic necessity in securing the optimum distribution of manpower and resources for the war effort. The importance of the extraordinary consequences that wartime conditions had on the subsequent development of regional policy is aptly summarised by Hennessy (1992: 209) who notes that, although the Barlow Report (1940) had already recommended that the government should take responsibility for the pattern of land use within the country:
"But for the war, a menu of this magnitude would have proved too much for the country's political or administrative classes to digest. At the very moment Barlow reported, the Ministries ... found themselves engaged in putting together the most ambitious regional policy ever. Its stimulant, of course, was Hitler not Barlow."
By the mid-late 1940s, attempts at regional planning had thus not only become more widespread, but also more closely linked to regional and economic policy. The zenith of regional planning fell in the immediate post war years, expressed through Abercrombie's regional plans for Greater London (1944) and the Clyde Valley (1946) , and linked to emerging economic policy and planning ideas espoused by the Barlow Report on the distribution of employment. Such plans typically combined strategies for population decentralisation to strategically located new towns with the protection of the countryside by the introduction of green belts.
The regional framework was maintained for post war reconstruction but was essentially ad hoc in nature. Regional inter-departmental committees were set up to deal with particular problems. For instance, there was an attempt after the war to co-ordinate land-use planning on a regional basis with the regional officers of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning responsible for overseeing local planning activities. Inter-departmental Physical Planning Committees were established by the Ministry in each region. The regional officers of the Board of Trade and the Ministries of Transport, Labour and Agriculture were members, and other departments of the nationalised industries sent representatives to meetings when necessary. However, these committees had no executive powers and they gradually fell into disuse in the 1950s when the Conservative governments felt that there was little need for the continued co-ordination of local planning policies on a regional basis. According to Smith (1964) , the decline of regionalism in the immediate post war period was the result of two principal factors. First, there had been increasing withdrawal of government controls over industry, and many Chambers of Commerce and Trade Associations advocated a return to the pre-war situation when direct contact was made with Whitehall. Second, local authorities were dissatisfied with the bureaucracy and the duplication of staff resources and functions which resulted from the presence of an additional layer of central government in the regions. At the same time, the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act laid the foundations for a national planning system based around the preparation of mandatory development plans at the local level, to which physical land-use planning at the regional scale was essentially subordinate. Thus, by the early 1950s, both regional planning and regional economic policies were in decline (Wannop and Cherry, 1994; Wannop, 1995) .
The 1960s witnessed a partial reawakening of interest in regional planning and regional policy and economic development. This was linked to the growing recognition of regional problems, and in particular the chronic problem of unemployment and economic stagnation in the northern regions of England, and in Scotland and Wales. According to the National Economic Development Council, regional economic development should be stimulated through a combination of capital investment in infrastructure, housing, sites and premises, and through the creation of 'growth points' in areas like the Tyneside-Teesside industrial complex identified in the Hailsham report (Smith, 1965a; Cullingworth, 1985) . As a result, policy sought to create a more equitable geographical distribution of industrial growth to combat structural unemployment in the areas most severely affected by the decline of British heavy industry. At the same time, regional policies aimed simultaneously to reduce congestion and rising production costs brought by rapid population growth in the over-heated labour markets of the South East; the resulting South East Study (1964) representing the first major regional study produced since the 1940s. These aims also underlay the creation of regional associations or councils, the purpose of which was to promote economic and industrial expansion through a tripartite coalition of central government, local authorities and other regional interests such as industry, trade unions and higher education institutions. Significantly, this was premised on a recognition that industrial development would have to mesh with other aspects of social and economic development if regional economic expansion was to be bolstered; in this way, the previously separate strands of economic development and land-use planning fleetingly converged. Although individual responsibility for planning decisions remained with local authorities, the associations provided an opportunity for neighbouring local authorities to co-ordinate their plans for the development of roads, houses, industrial sites and other amenities affecting regional prosperity.
This upsurge of interest in regional economic development and land-use planning in the 1960s was uneven in form. Smith (1965b) notes that the stimuli for regionally-based policy varied markedly between different regions. For the East and West Midlands, the West Riding, the South East and South West -all more concerned with accommodating the expansion of existing industry than with facilitating new growth -regional associations were less well-developed and less expansive in their membership, comprising mainly local authority representatives. For these regions, there was a limited rationale for investing in policies to stimulate industrial development. By contrast, the North East and (to a lesser extent) the North West were regions in which persistent problems of unemployment and economic stagnation had encouraged more inclusive institutional alliances as local authorities were more prepared to forgo some degree of local autonomy in the interest of regional economic revival, and to extend their membership to include many other organisations concerned with industrial and economic development. As a result, regional associations in the north of England -the North East Development Council being a notable example -stood out as some of the more successful examples of organically-formed regional institutional structures.
Piecemeal mechanisms, involving joint associations of local authorities and commissioned studies, paved the way for regional and sub-regional policy statements such as the regional development plans for the North East and Central Scotland (1963) and the South East Study (1964) . These, in turn, gave way to a more formalised approach to regional policy and planning, which emerged with the election of a Labour government in 1964. A new central Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) established a series of economic planning councils in six regions, consisting of members appointed by government to represent different regional interests. The responsibility of the regional economic councils was to deal with broad strategy on regional development and to consider the best use of the regions' resources. They were also charged with the preparation of regional studies and plans. Essentially advisory bodies without any executive powers or resources, lacking any direct democratic accountability to local electorates -and denied any corresponding legitimacy as a result -the councils came to be perceived as merely another form of administrative deconcentration (Smith, 1965a) : an incipient 'Whitehall of the regions' which foreshadowed many of the subsequent institutional innovations.
Paralleling the economic planning councils, economic planning boards were also established by the Wilson government. Consisting of seconded civil servants, their principal remit was to co-ordinate central government planning and development activities within the regions. The councils advised the boards, which were central government off-shoots, responsible to Ministers and Departments in Whitehall, and lacked any direct democratic accountability to the regional populace. Although their brief centred on economic planning, the councils' need to consider associated infrastructural issuesand, in the more buoyant regions, the decentralisation of population and employment -increasingly led them into the realms of physical land-use planning, in addition to their more narrowly-defined role in stimulating economic growth (Stewart, 1979) . In the event, the record of the councils and boards was mixed (Hall, 1992) . Although every council did prepare a regional study, and most produced a regional plan, they lacked the means of implementation and, by the time they reported back to central government in the 1970s, inter-ministerial rivalries and a lack of resources meant that their proposals were often largely ignored.
From this brief overview of the historic experience of regional policy and planning, a number of observations can be made:
• First, there is a tendency for successful regional institution-building -for both physical land-use planning and regional economic policy -to be correlated with economic and social adversity. The most successful regionally-based interventions have been in periods of distress (notably during times of war and post-war reconstruction) and in areas of distress (notably in the north east region of England).
• Second, a large proportion of regionally-based intervention has comprised modest administrative deconcentration rather than any radical devolution of power and responsibilities. The lack of any substantive structural change to regional governance has been a theme which has continually underlain critiques of regional land-use planning and economic development policy (Hall, 1992) .
To a large extent, innovation in regional governance has been confined to attempts to co-ordinate public sector expenditure, and to assist in the achievement of particular national economic policy objectives (for example, through growth poles, assistance to industry or inward investment promotion).
• Third, the development of regional planning and economic development initiatives has been notably capricious, with a rapid turnover of agencies characterised by short life-spans (Hebbert, 1982 ).
• Fourth, until the late 1970s, regional interventions have been dominated by the public sector, both in terms of the formulation and delivery of policy. Although a tripartite partnership (between local and central government, business and trade unions) nominally underlay many of the pre-1980s regional coalitions, de facto leadership was provided by civil servants, working in conjunction with local authorities. The precise balance of power between partners -and degree of inclusiveness -varied marginally between different regions, but public sector leadership across all regions reflected a consensual wisdom that government had a duty to oversee the equitable allocation of housing and infrastructural resources and to stimulate economic growth and industrial diversification (Smith, 1964) .
• Fifth, regional policy in much of the post-war period has revolved around economic concerns.
Linkages with land-use planning and development have often been weak, and regional policies have tended to subordinate 'balanced development' to economic growth, generally ignoring the merits of the integration of environmental and (to a lesser extent) social concerns within regional planning (Steeley, 1984) .
The remainder of this paper considers the fortunes of regionally-based land-use planning and economic development policies introduced in the 1990s and, in light of the experience of earlier initiatives, assesses the prospects for the latest set of 'regional' proposals. The historic absence of holism in regional policy has been mirrored by the relative paucity of academic interest in examining the linkages between regional economic development policies, on one hand, and physical land-use planning, on the other. This has been partly the result of the compartmentalisation of 'regionalism' into separate spheres, fragmented across academic disciplines (Smith 1965b; Glasson, 1978) .
Nevertheless, there have been some notable attempts to explore the linkages between economic development and physical land-use planning (e.g. Powell, 1978; Roberts, 1994 Roberts, , 1997 Glasson, 1995; DETR, 1997 DETR, , 1998a EC, 1997; Gibbs, 1998) to which this paper seeks to add and update. The general conclusion to emerge from the academic literature is that it is artificial to separate regional planning from broader physical and economic processes, and that co-ordination between regional land-use planning and regional economic development policy is a pre-requisite for self-sustaining growth (Cullingworth, 1985; Powell, 1978) . Subsequent sections of the paper update the story of regional economic policy and land-use planning and examine the potential for a more integrated regional development approach under the current proposals of the Blair Labour government.
Regional policy and planning in the 1990s
Earlier experiments in regional policy and planning had effectively ended even before the Thatcher government formally abolished the regional economic councils in 1979. During the 1980s, the focus of central government policy shifted away from broader regional development towards targeted urban policy initiatives in the 'inner cities' and some outer estates, whilst attempts to 'lift the burden' of bureaucratic controls on free enterprise resulted in a radically reformed and truncated planning system (Thornley, 1993) . The abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) and the metropolitan counties in the mid-1980s did, however, result in the introduction of strategic planning guidance in an attempt to provide some degree of strategic land-use policy co-ordination across the newly-established unitary metropolitan boroughs. Although extremely limited in its own right, the format and preparation process of strategic guidance was to provide the model for the first significant moves towards the reestablishment of regional planning and development activities which emerged largely during the postThatcher Conservative administrations of 1990-97.
This re-awakening of interest in regional planning in the early 1990s can be attributed to increasing environmental concerns in the more affluent Tory shires over the inexorable spread of new housing development, paradoxically coupled with fears from business/property interests that a lack of strategic/regional land-use co-ordination might result in insufficient provision of land for future development as smaller district councils retreated into 'nimbyism' ('not in my back yard…'). One tangible policy reflection of these concerns came with the advent of Regional Planning Guidance, which provided statements of national planning policy for each of the English regions, with final guidance issued for all eight English regions by May 1996. RPG has been widely criticised, however, on the grounds of its over-centralised and lengthy preparation process, lack of regional specificity, and limited content (see, for example, Roberts 1996; Baker, 1998; DETR, 1998a) . In its original incarnation, RPG was reproached as a blunt and slight tool around which to base regional land-use planning: whereas, for example, the Strategic Plan for the Northern Region (1977) stretched to four volumes, the Regional Planning Guidance for the Northern Region (Department of the Environment, 1993) comprised a mere thirteen pages (including appendices) and did little more than reiterate existing national planning policy.
A parallel development under the Major administration was the creation of new Government Offices for the Regions in April 1994. These brought together the previously separate regional arms of the Departments of Environment, Transport, Employment and Trade and Industry (Mawson, 1996; Mawson and Spencer, 1997a, 1997b) , but excluded other 'non-regional' government departments such as Agriculture and the Home Office. The GORs were created as new structures through which to promote greater administrative efficiency and effectiveness, principally by providing a mechanism to facilitate the co-ordination of policy across central government departments at the regional level, for example for programmes such as the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). The GORs were also intended to provide a single voice through which regional needs and wants could be articulated to the European Commission. They were viewed by central government as a means of providing the degree of regional cohesion necessary to maximise financial assistance garnered through the EU structural funds, and, from within the Commission itself, as representing one of the building blocks around which embryonic EU spatial planning structures might be constructed.
A rapidly growing interest in regional issues and institutions, stimulated further by the election of a Labour Government in May 1997, resulted in proposals for another round of regional economic development activities and enhanced regional planning, the latter forming part of a wider review of the planning system under the banner of 'modernising planning'. The government's consultation paper on the Future of Regional Planning Guidance (DETR, 1998a) and subsequent draft PPG11 (DETR, 1999a) proposed the continuation of existing RPG mechanisms, but with some significant amendments designed to enhance and strengthen the status of the resulting guidance. In essence, the proposal was that regional associations of local authorities should prepare regional planning guidance, but should also involve a greater range of other regional stakeholders (private sector, voluntary, environmental interests) in the process. The resulting draft RPG is to be subject to examination in public (EIP) provisions similar to those currently in place for structure plans (Baker and Wong, 1997) .
Responsibility for issuing final guidance will remain in the hands of the Secretary of State, and local planning authorities will be expected to take account of such guidance when preparing their development plans. It is also expected that these new forms of RPG will be much more regionallyspecific than the existing guidance, much of which is acknowledged merely to paraphrase national planning policy (Roberts 1996; Baker, 1998; DETR, 1998a) . Table 1 th November 1998. Each RDA is a non-departmental public body accountable to Ministers (though also indirectly, and informally, accountable to Regional Chambers), with appointed boards comprising around twelve members, drawn from a variety of regional stakeholders, but dominated by business interests. The RDAs have five formal objectives: to advance regional economic development and regeneration; to encourage business investment, efficiency and competitiveness; to boost employment levels; to assist with the development of 'relevant' skills; and to promote sustainable forms of development. Within these formal objectives, three main elements lie at the heart of the RDAs' remit: to develop an economic strategy for the region (separately from the RPG mentioned above); to advise and monitor other regional agencies in related fields; and to administer programmes for regeneration and inward investment (DETR, 1998c) .
Their resources are drawn largely from functions inherited from other central government agencies such as the GORs, from which they have assumed responsibility for managing the SRB (although formal funding decisions will continue to rest with Ministers). Alongside this, they also inherited resources and responsibilities from the regional offices of English Partnerships to assemble and develop land and premises, together with staff and powers from the (Rural) Development Commission to regenerate rural areas. In addition, RDAs have the power to offer grants and loans to firms, and to purchase and dispose of land (for which they have vesting and compulsory purchase powers). The
Secretary of State has powers to designate local regeneration areas within which RDAs can assume statutory development control powers from the local planning authority. A lengthy preparation process in the lead-up to their establishment has involved the identification of Chairmen-designate for each of the RDAs, and the appointment of Chief Executives in late 1998. Shadow secretariats have been established and work has begun on developing draft regional economic strategies, with a view to publication by the end of 1999.
A further dimension to evolving regional institutions is the establishment of voluntary Regional
Chambers, which aim to provide a regional voice representing a range of regional stakeholders (DETR, 1997) . Strongly linked to existing regional associations (and regional planning conferences), each region is making its own progress towards the establishment of such Chambers, although there are some established rules within which they must operate, including a requirement to include 30% non-local authority members (see DETR, 1998b) . Preparatory work on Chambers varied across regions (see Benneworth, 1998 and Roberts & Lloyd, 1998 for a review on progress in the establishment of both RDAs and Regional Chambers) with some (such as Yorkshire and Humberside) already launched, and others (such as the Eastern region) at an earlier stage in their development.
Back to the Future? Prospects for the future integration of regional planning and economic development earlier years. Changes in the surrounding economic context as a result of the increasing globalisation of investment, the reduced concern with redistribution, and the increased emphasis on improving supply side factors and bolstering competitiveness, in combination present regional land-use planning and economic development policy with different sets of problems to address and opportunities to exploit. On the land-use planning front, likewise, the policymaking emphasis has shifted towards sustainability concerns and interest in the implications of the scale and distribution of new development, and away from the desire merely to facilitate development by providing the necessary infrastructure and facilities.
Nevertheless, current proposals for regional land-use planning and economic development do resemble earlier initiatives in that the proposed arrangements again involve two parallel sets of institutional framework and process which exhibit different characteristics (table 2) . On one hand, the 'solution' to regional economic underdevelopment has been to create new institutional structures along the lines of the existing Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies (albeit with considerably fewer resources), whilst on the other the enhancement of RPG echoes the regional plans prepared in earlier years by regional local government associations. In this section, we consider the degree to which these proposals are likely to repeat the difficulties which undermined the regional planning initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, we explore three spheres of difficulty said to have enervated earlier initiatives:
• the inadequate powers of regulation or implementation available to regional initiatives, and the limited resources at their disposal;
• the lack of integration between subsets of regional policy, with particular reference to physical land-use and environmental planning on the one hand, and economic planning on the other; and
• the lack of central government commitment or willingness to embrace democratic accountability at the regional level.
(insert table 2 somewhere near here)
Powers of implementation
Proposals for both RDAs and enhanced RPG are posited on a view that there is a need to establish an order and cohesion across policymakers, institutions and initiatives within regions. The creation of will have to relate to, and contribute towards, common regional priorities -something which, implicitly, earlier RPG has largely failed to convey. In both cases, then, co-ordination, whether of local regeneration agencies or local planning authorities, is central to their remit; but in both cases, there are questions concerning the extent to which their powers enable them effectively to discharge this role.
The principal mechanism through which the RDAs are supposed to accomplish this co-ordinating role involves the development of a regional economic strategy to which the various sub-regional implementing bodies -Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), local authorities, regeneration partnerships, Business Links, further and higher education institutions, tourist boards -are supposed to adhere in executing their own policies, and in developing their own strategies. At the same time, the RDAs (in contrast to the old regional economic councils) are also to be granted powers and resources for implementation, primarily through a revamped Single Regeneration Budget, providing up to £250 million 'new' money annually. Initial suggestions that RDAs would also be granted responsibility for the New Deal for Communities -the other element of government's New Deal for Regeneration, providing £800 million from -2001 -proved unfounded (HM-Treasury, 1998 Social Exclusion Unit, 1998: 55-56) . In total, RDA funding -from central government grant-in-aid, and through private borrowing of up to £200 million for all RDAs at any one time -is likely to amount to around £750 million annually, shared across the nine agencies (Dyson et al, 1998: 11) .
Nevertheless, concern has already been expressed that the lack of any real additional finance -the SRB and other RDA funding sources primarily come from transfers of existing programmes -will be a significant constraint on the added value that the RDAs are supposed to deliver (Dewar and Forrester, 1998).
Resource limitations reinforce the importance of RDAs constructing effective relationships with the various sub-regional implementing bodies. However, the enabling legislation raises a number of uncertainties about the shape of these unfolding intra-regional relations. Arrangements for local economic development provide one illustration of the potential constraints on the RDAs' attempts to discharge their regional managerial role . The relationship between RDAs, on one hand, and TECs and Business Links (two of the key implementing agencies with regard to skills training, small firm development and business support) on the other, is multi-stranded. RDA regional economic strategies are supposed to provide an overarching framework within which agencies like TECs and Business Links can operate. In the case of the North West Development Agency, the skills provisions of the regional economic strategy are to inform the publication of a skills action plan, providing a more detailed (but still informal) framework for TEC activities. At the same time, RDAs have to monitor the degree to which TECs and Business Links contribute towards regional priorities (DETR, 1997: 28) and, as part of their regeneration remit, have to ensure adequate training provision for any major inward investments (DETR, 1997: 44) . The RDAs have also inherited three budgets from the Department for Education and Employment -the Skills Challenge and Centres of Excellence
Fund, the Further Education Collaboration Fund and the Higher Education Regional Development
Fund -each of which, in various ways, provides more direct means of intervention in local labour markets. However, in spite of their managerial responsibilities, and despite the modest resources at their disposal for more direct forms of intervention, the RDAs lack any formal control over the activities of many of the sub-regional implementing agencies. In the case of TECs, lines of funding (and, by extension, formal accountability) continue to centre on the GORs, from whom resources for mainstream government training programmes are channelled, and with whom priorities are agreed.
This puts TECs in the confused position of being formally answerable to GORs on questions of contractual responsibility, objective-setting, funding and performance, and simultaneously, but informally, to RDAs in terms of their adherence to regional economic strategies. This led the House of Commons Education and Employment Committee (1998: 5-7) to conclude that the ability of RDAs to orchestrate regional human resource development in an effective way would be severely impaired:
"…we do not think RDAs' powers will actually amount to a 'strong influence' [over TECs]….we are very conscious of the dangers of simply adding RDAs as an extra layer to the structures already in place for regional skills development….. [T] his is likely to result in duplication of effort, confusion of roles and conflicting priorities….We believe that the proposed framework could be a recipe for confusion…and frustration for TECs."
Arguments about limited powers of implementation also underlie concerns about the effectiveness with which the proposed regional planning mechanisms will be able to deliver a workable framework for local planning. Despite the reforms heralded by the consultation paper, the preparation of an effective regional plan may be constrained by both a lack of resources and of statutory powers of implementation. The initial round of RPG preparation in the early 1990s was characterised by both slow production times (averaging around four years) and ineffective strategy development (Baker, 1996) . One significant reason for this was related to the resources and staffing available to oversee the task, both in the local government sector and the Government Offices. To prepare a robust, comprehensive and effective regional plan is likely to require the services of a dedicated team of professionals (probably akin to those already set up at the sub-regional scale in the former counties of Avon and Tees Valley to oversee joint structure planning), but nowhere in the current proposals is their any mention of any extra resource to achieve this level of staffing. In its absence, a continuation of regional planning via what almost amounts to part-time, voluntary arrangements by planning officers already mainly occupied by local planning responsibilities, is unlikely to deliver fully the improvements set out in the consultation paper.
Then there are the likely difficulties of joint-policy making to consider, with the inherent dangers of disagreement, political compromise and 'lowest common denominator' approaches, as representatives of different local authorities and other stakeholders within regions grapple with the problems of jointly preparing integrated regional planning strategies that will also be acceptable to their constituent authorities or organisations, many of which will almost inevitably have a narrower remit (either geographically or sectorally). There also remains the possibility of tensions between the local planning associations/conferences, who will progress the regional guidance through its early stages, and central government, which retains the final right of approval and publication. Indeed, earlier attempts by regional conferences such as those in the West Midlands to prepare RPG which more specifically reflected regional (rather than national) priorities were diluted following submission to the Secretary of State for the Environment, and were subsequently reconfigured as re-statements of national planning guidance at the regional level. Since the new arrangements proposed in PPG11 still involve final publication by the Secretary of State, such problems may re-surface, changes in the national political climate notwithstanding. Even if an effective, regionally distinctive and visionary plan is produced, its lack of statutory status as part of the statutory development plan (which, under current planning legislation, carries significant weight in planning decisions) might make implementation less certain.
Despite these genuine concerns, there are nevertheless some encouraging signs that some of these problems might be at least partly addressed under the new arrangements. Although the RPG documents will not be afforded statutory status, they can nevertheless be expected still to have an increased influence upon the content of development plans at the local level, as the requirement to take account of such guidance is built into current planning legislation and related plan-making regulations. The regional inputs (and regional specificity) of RPG are also increasing, and it is possible that the Secretary of State's role will dwindle in the future towards predominantly one of 'rubber-stamping' policies and proposals already debated and agreed within each region via the new EIP mechanisms.
Integration between different spheres of policy
Uncertainties remain over the extent to which RDAs possess the resources necessary to accomplish the co-ordination of the activities of the various sub-regional implementing bodies, and over the ability of RPG to influence local development plan provisions in any meaningful way. At the same time, another potential constraint on the effectiveness with which regional co-ordination is executed is the relationship between RDAs and RPG. The separation of the RDAs from the arrangements for RPG preparation means that a notable opportunity for co-ordination and cohesion has been lost (TCPA, 1997). Nevertheless, proposals for RDAs and revised RPG do acknowledge the need for integration with each other. The 'regional stakeholders' involved in the preparation of RPG are expected to include the RDA (and other business interests) and, equally, the RDAs' regional economic strategies are expected to take account of RPG. Government's view is that "there will be no hierarchy between RPG and RDAs' regional strategies; they will be parallel and complementary regimes, the one influencing the other in an iterative way" (quoted in House of Commons Environment Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, 1998b: para. 15). Beyond this, however, the precise nature of the relationship is unspecified and, as a result, uncertain. 'Sustainable development' is listed as the fifth of the RDAs' statutory objectives yet there is little in the legislation to suggest how this might be achieved (Gibbs, 1998) . This has led the House of Commons Select Committee on Environment Transport and Regional Affairs (1998a: para 43) to comment that, "...it is unclear how conflicts between sustainability, regional planning and economic development will be resolved".
The lack of a formal role in regional land-use planning reinforces the need for RDAs, as prospective enablers of development, to nurture effective working relationships with planning authorities within their areas, particularly in those cases where new development will have regionally strategic implications. Where the priorities of RDA economic strategies and RPG come into conflict, in the first instance the GORs will occupy a mediating role, and in the last resort Ministerial intervention will be necessary, with Ministers issuing formal guidance or offering direction (House of Commons Environment Transport and Regional Affairs Select Committee, 1998b: para 15). However, the important point to note is that, despite acknowledgement of the need for integration in PPG11 and government guidance on the new RDAs, there are no formal structural mechanisms in place to ensure the development of relationships between the RDAs, on one hand, and GORs, standing conferences and individual local planning authorities, on the other, and to ensure that conflicts worthy of GOR or ministerial intervention do not arise in the first place. Instead, there is an assumption that intraregional relationships will somehow evolve in a consensual spirit of co-operation, with each RDA entrusted to cultivate effective relationships with other regional institutions:
"…the Government believe that, within their regions, RDAs will deliver their remit most effectively if they offer a partnership approach, developing consensus and a spirit of cooperation between regional bodies and organisations. In many respects, it will be for RDAs… to consider how they will wish to organise themselves within their region, how they wish relationships to develop to suit the particular circumstances of their region, and how they should deliver their remit to the Government." Equally, the appointment of professionally qualified planners to head two of the eight RDAs may offset the potential for conflict between RDAs' development-led priorities and the land-use planning interests expressed through RPG (Dewar and Forrester, 1998) . Nevertheless, regardless of the background of senior personnel, and notwithstanding government exhortations for strategies for economic growth to be closely linked to regional planning, it remains the case that they are to be pursued under very different administrative machinery, by bodies with differing degrees of local accountability, and with no clear guidance on how conflicts are to be resolved and integration achieved.
These difficulties have led to calls from some commentators and pressure groups like the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) that RDAs -which, it is argued, should be democratically accountable -should be granted statutory powers of approval over RPG, which would continue to be prepared by GORs, informed by standing conference of local planning authorities (TCPA, 1997).
This, they argue, would help achieve a regional consensus about contentious issues such as housing land targets, or, by extension, similarly troublesome issues such as the location of strategic sites for inward investment. The Regional Development Agencies Act, however, ignores such admonitions, omitting to bestow RDAs with strategic plan preparation responsibilities, or the power of statutory approval, on the grounds that this should remain the responsibility of democratically elected bodies.
Given that the regional orchestrating role is central to the RDA brief, it would seem that the lack of such powers is a major handicap. Nevertheless, the problem of democratic accountability is not easily swept aside. Unless the RDAs themselves were made more accountable (through Regional Chambers or, eventually, fully elected regional government?), their business-led partnership remains an example of what Mawson and Hall (1998: 6) identify as the problem of the lack of "...openness and accountability of the new governance structures..." which "...
[weaken]…the capacity of the state to handle complex interrelated policy issues".
There are also powerful arguments for allowing GORs (in consultation with standing conferences of local authorities) to retain regional planning guidance responsibilities, not least of which is to avoid the conflicts of interest between non-elected agencies and planning authorities which undermined some earlier regeneration agencies such as Urban Development Corporations Robson et al, 1998) . In contrast to the proposed arrangements via RDAs for devising strategies for economic growth and competitiveness in the regions, utilising RPG as a co-ordinating mechanism does also at least partly address the concerns relating to democratic accountability since, under the currently proposed RPG framework, there is a stronger democratic element in the preparation of regional plans (through the primary involvement of local planning authorities) and also wider opportunities for public participation in the process. RPG also has an inherently broader remit than the RDAs' economic strategies, covering economic, social and environmental considerations; a point recognised in draft PPG11 which refers to the RPGs' role in setting a general spatial strategy for their regions which should be subject to a full sustainability appraisal (DETR, 1999a).
There are, then, compelling arguments that regional planning mechanisms (through expanded and improved RPG) ought to take on board an integrating and overarching role in relation to RDA economic strategies. However, it is far from clear that RPG will ever be accorded such status. The provisional timetables for revised RPG preparation (set out in table 2) suggest that in two regions (East Anglia and South East) the revised RPG will have reached a relatively advanced stage before the RDAs officially come into existence in April 1999. In such cases, it is possible that the RDAs will be denied the opportunity for influence afforded to their counterparts in other regions, or that RPG might be delayed by the Government Office so as to incorporate the views of the new agencies in the final guidance. In all other regions, the public examinations of RPG are likely to occur after the publication of RDA regional economic strategies (expected by around autumn 1999) and therefore can be expected to play a full part in the ensuing deliberations over regional land-use policy.
Furthermore, at least one legal commentator has suggested that, should discrepancies occur between the strategies being prepared by the RDAs and the emerging RPG, it is likely that the former will take precedence (Dewar and Forrester, 1998) . In such circumstances, it is conceivable that the RDAs will emerge as the more powerful of the regional institutions in terms of overall strategy development, the role of RPG will be marginalised and the inclusive tripartite partnerships of earlier regional planning initiatives may be replaced by one dominated by private sector and business interests. Adding to the potential confusion, there is also the issue of the relationship of both the RDAs' economic strategies and RPG to further layers of regional strategy-making linked to funding programmes (e.g. Single
Programme Documents) and spatial development (European Spatial Development Perspective) at the European level.
Regional accountability
The proposed institutional and policy frameworks comprise a set of uniform directives, within which each region has to follow central government's twin-track approach towards regional development, straddling regional economic development on one hand, and strategic regional land-use planning on the other. Regions are expected to pursue both 'economic competitiveness' and the achievement of a 'sustainable environment' in parallel, without the autonomy to prioritise either of these two sets of potentially conflicting objectives in light of prevailing region-specific circumstances. Under such a centralist approach, it will remain difficult for regions independently to develop their own visions and to strike a proper balance and combination of resources to maximise their own regional advantage, both in economic and environmental terms. This is particularly important given the welter of empirical evidence cataloguing substantial interregional variations both in terms of levels of economic development and the informal economic development agendas being pursued by policymakers (see, for example, Wong, 1998a). In view of such disparities, the limited flexibility afforded to regionsand, arguably, the continued tendency towards the 'incorporation' of regional planning within a centralist state -runs the risk of producing hackneyed identikit approaches to economic development, only part of which builds on regional specificities.
Regional Chambers could provide one forum through which distinctively regional issues could be explored. They also provide a channel for engendering greater regional accountability, and through which potential conflicts -between RPG and RDA strategies, or with constituent sub-regional bodies -might be resolved. Regional Chambers are to consist of councillors drawn from constituent local authorities together with a smaller (but representative) groupings of other regional stakeholders from different sectors (DETR, 1997) . One part of their remit will be to oversee -informally -the work of the RDAs. The Regional Development Agencies Act contains powers to enable Regional Chambers to be designated by the Secretary of State, and these can scrutinise the work of RDAs and (as one of a number of statutory consultees) can inform subsequent preparation of regional economic strategies and corporate plans, even though they lack any power formally to approve them (DETR, 1998c) .
This, together with the suggestion in the RDA White Paper that agency board meetings be open to public scrutiny (DETR, 1997: 54) , and the provision in Section 18 of the Regional Development
Agencies Act that RDAs must hold a public meeting following the production of their annual report (Wood, 1998) The Regional Chambers can also be expected to take on a more formal overseeing role in the production of RPG. Indeed a significant number of the members of the Chamber (especially those from local authorities) already sit on regional planning conferences and are directly responsible for RPG. There are, though, a number of contentious issues -for example, over controversial land-use planning decisions, the nature of training provision, or the location of inward investment -which are unlikely to fade unless Regional Chambers can evolve into bodies with greater legitimacy to support and implement RDA proposals or RPG provisions. This is a view which finds some support in the local economic development policy community, as evidenced by a study of the perceptions of policymakers at the end of 1996 (see Wong, 1998a) . Although, at that time, a large majority of the interviewees welcomed proposals by the Labour Party -then in opposition -for democraticallyaccountable Regional Chambers, fears were expressed that this could lead to the creation of another, superfluous institutional layer (see table 3 ).
In the event, only in Greater London (which is to have a new strategic authority and a democratically elected mayor) will new regional arrangements embrace full democratic accountability. Elsewhere in the English regions, the newly-created Regional Chambers have not been slow to recognise the critical nature of their relationships with the RDAs if an integrated strategic approach is to be achieved. The danger, however, is that although the Chambers are likely to provide a regional voice (dominated by the local government sector), the RDAs may prove to be mainly creatures of the centre. Such fears prompted the director of the Yorkshire and Humberside Regional Assembly to question whether RDAs will, "...end up [as] RDAs in the region rather than of the region.." and to consider how far their economic strategies will take account of the Chamber's strategic framework (Kerry, 1998: 31, emphasis added) .
(insert table 3 here)
The scope for Regional Chambers to develop a genuinely powerful presence is likely to vary from region to region, with some exercising significant scrutiny over RDA activities, but others operating in the more minimalist manner set out in the legislation. For RPG, likewise, the degree to which Chambers can influence the nature and scope of plans is likely to depend on their particular makeup.
Again, it remains questionable whether Chambers will develop sufficiently expansive remits effectively to agree priorities shared by the different regional bodies, and to resolve any conflicts between them. In the meantime, it is more likely that the only regionally-based organisation which might be able to take on a co-ordinating role (potentially linking both the centre and the locality, and bridging across different sectors) and, equally significantly, which might possess the necessary powers of decision-making and implementation, will not be the Chamber or the RDA, but the Government Offices of the Regions. The ability of the GORs to fulfil this role may, however, be compromised by the exclusion of key departments (such as MAFF) from the GOR structures, as well as their dual role as both a regional partner/stakeholder and an administrative arm of central government.
Conclusion
After nearly two decades in which formal regional economic plans have been absent, current proposals mean that each region in England will soon have two formal routes through which regional strategy will be articulated. This raises questions about the value of collapsing physical land-use planning and economic development policies into a single regional plan. Friedmann and Weaver (1979) some years ago identified a shift away from the 'territorial integration' approaches of regional planning in America, and towards a greater emphasis on the 'functional integration' of economic development in a wider economic system. Echoing past experiences, under the current proposals regional land-use planning in England is once again likely to remain semi-detached from regional economic concerns, and economic development policies will continue to represent the latest, limited attempt at administrative decentralisation from Whitehall.
This continuing fragmentation of regional-level strategy-building is exacerbated by the lack of any clear structural mechanism through which to facilitate dialogue between the various regionally-based actors and institutions. Some commentators argue that regional planners should no longer be restricted to preparing regional plans, but should assume new roles as mediators for negotiation on issues of regional controversy (see Dietrichs, 1989) . This echoes recent debates regarding collaborative approaches to policy-making (Healey, 1997), but the lack of clear guidance from the centre inherent in current arrangements means that this will be very much dependent on the willingness of local actors to pursue such approaches. The personality of the key players and their social networks can be expected to represent a significant influence on the success of such collaborative relationships, and this is likely to vary considerably between different regions with differing levels and forms of regional consciousness, political culture and inter-institutional chemistry. That declining regions have tended to be more cohesive in terms of cross-institutional and cross-sector collaboration (Robson and Deas, 1999; Wong, 1998a Wong, , 1998b suggests that tensions between RDA objectives and RPG priorities are likely to be most marked outwith the north of England. The heightened tension between development pressures for housing and employment and strong environmental concerns in southern regions, and especially the South East, also suggest that conflict between the RDAs' economic development strategies and the emerging RPG could be most acute in these areas. 76) observes, regardless of the degree to which Chambers evolve towards more powerful assemblies, "English regional government will remain functionally, financially and legislatively inferior to the Scottish Parliament … and distinct from (though more similar to) the Welsh Assembly".
In this absence of more formalised structural mechanisms to make the link between land-use and economic planning, or the creation of an elected regional tier of government with overarching responsibilities for both planning and economic development, the roles of the voluntary Regional Chambers and the GORs (which can be expected to have strong links to the new RDAs and are also involved in RPG preparation) in each region will be crucial in ensuring that, as far as is possible, these two policy regimes are integrated. Whether either will be able to take on this role -or, indeed, whether they will operate in harness -is uncertain. Whereas the Regional Chambers might be able to exercise a degree of regional autonomy and regional distinctiveness in policymaking, if the GORs assume the primary role it can be expected that regional policymaking will remain essentially in the realms of further administrative deconcentration from central government. However, if neither body is able to do so, the experience of regional planning and development in the 1990s may prove as frustrating as that of the 1960s and 1970s. 
